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Safe computing 
Thomas L. Casavant 
Bruce M. McMillin 
How “diseases” are transmitted, 
and safety measures network 
partners can take 
into our office-for warmth. This in- 
vasion was compounded by an enor- 
mous array of snacks an office mate 
kept in his desk. The snacks made 
the office particularly attractive for 
the little creatures. The mice didn’t 
really bother us since they would 
scoot through the office late at night. 
Each morning, our office mate, how- 
ever, found more snacks gone and 
little brown presents left by the mice 
in his desk. He took it upon him- 
self to safeguard his goodies. First 
he attempted to plug all the holes in 
the office by stuffing every nook and 
cranny with aluminum foil. Anyone 
who’s ever had mice in their house 
realizes the fallacy in this move; the 
mice just find new holes. When this 
process proved ineffective, he began 
to set mouse traps. This realized im- 
pressive results; we caught several 
mice per day for weeks. The mouse 
count even made it into the depart- 
mental system’s log-in message. Af- 
ter a while the number of catches fell 
off-but not the mice droppings in 
his desk. 
The purpose of this article is not 
to describe rodent problems nor is 
it to preach on the evils of snack 
food. Rather, we are interested in the 
problems of unwanted benign or ma- 
licious “visitors” in a computing sys- 
tem connected to a computer inter- 
network. The popular press has been 
inundated with versions of “virus at- 
tacks” and “worm attacks.” Unfortu- 
nately, the analogies of these attacks 
drawn by the popular press, as well 
as by some computing profession- 
als, to their biological counterparts 
has unnecessarily increased the mys- 
tique surrounding these attacks. We 
grudgingly acknowledge these labels 
of worm, virus, and trojan horse for 
the purposes of discussion and give 
technical definitions for each in Fig- 
ure 1. 
The now infamous “Christmas 
tree worm” of 1987 led off the most 
recent wave. A user composed a 
program that, when executed, dis- 
played a view of a Christmas tree 
and a greeting. This program was sent 
to several users on the BITNET 
computer network, who also ran this 
program. As a side effect, however, 
the program looked at all the elec- 
tronic mail distribution lists of the 
user and forwarded the message to 
each address, much as the geomet- 
ric progression of a chain letter. 
The internetwork was swamped with 
greeting messages and, thus, effec- 
tively shut down attached networks 
for several days. A more recent at- 
tack occurred on the DARPA Inter- 
net* in November 1988. This, too, 
was a worm attack that exploited 
a well-known “hole” in the elec- 
tronic mail facility of computers run- 
ning the UNIX operating system. 
The worm was able to gain access to 
many UNIX systems and run many 
programs thus slowing down the sys- 
tems for all its normal users. 
Why is it so easy to create these 
worms? How did they come to such 
prominence? Are they bad? If so, 
how can we provide safe comput- 
ing in the sense that unauthorized or 
*Technically the DARPA Internet interconnects ma- 
jor government labs such as NSF, DOE, and NASA 
and most research institutions. The popular name 
ARPANET comes from the network created by 
the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) 
in the 1970’s. The name of the organization later 
was changed to the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA now oversees 
the DARPA Internet. 
I Is it a worm, virus, or trojan horse? 
A worm is a program that propagates itself from computer to 
computer. Worms may be benign or malicious. A beneficial worm 
might be a migration of computing workload to unused com- 
puters. An example of a malicious worm is the November 1988 
DARPA Internet intrusion in which a program rapidly replicated 
itself into many computers connected by a network. 
A virus is a piece of code that can incorporate itself into other 
programs. It is hidden into a program in the same way as a trojan 
horse and can propagate in a similar manner to a worm. 
A trojan horse is piece of code embedded in a program that 
performs unwanted actions. A sample program might be a log- 
in program that not only performs the log-in function but also 
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Why do we want an internetwork? 
searchers may submit programs to, and collect results from, 
these supercomputers from their own local workstations with- 
out ever leaving their offices. The savings in travel time are 
Fig. 2. lnternetworking applications 
unexpected intrusions are not possi- 
ble? To answer these questions, we 
must examine the vehicle that al- 
lowed these attacks to occur, namely 
the open computer internetwork. 
An internetwork allows for the in- 
terconnection of various types of 
physical networks, each with differ- 
ing technologies, into a single func- 
tional coordinated unit. This means 
that users can easily perform net- 
work applications (see Figure 2) 
such as electronic mail and elec- 
tronic bulletin boards. Researchers 
may submit computations to special- 
ized computers hundreds of miles 
away and receive the results of their 
computations at their local worksta- 
tions. The internetworking software 
forms an open systems interconnec- 
tion in which systems of different ar- 
chitectures can cooperate to form a 
single internetwork. 
Members of an internetwork agree 
to provide certain sewices to other 
members of the internetwork. Mem- 
bers of the DARPA Internet use 
a standardized agreement for infor- 
mation exchange called the Internet 
Protocol or IP. The TCP (Transmis- 
sion Control Protocol) utilizes the IP 
to send and receive messages at well 
known ports. A port is an address at 
which a service resides. For exam- 
ple, the ability to send and receive 
electronic mail is maintained by a 
specific port within the TCP. The 
ability to transfer files is provided at 
another port. All in all there are 
several hundred ports reserved for 
use by well-known services. On the 
down side, each one of these ports is, 
in principle, a point at which a sys- 
tem may be entered or compromised. 
How does secure communication 
against maliciousness fit into this 
scheme? In both of the examples 
presented, it would have been easy 
to make the attacks malicious (for 
example deleting or modifying files) 
thus causing great damage; nothing 
in the system security prevented a 
malicious attack, it was the worm 
author’s decision not to be malicious. 
The formal study of computer net- 
work security, for the most part, has 
concentrated on preventing attacks 
on the association model (Figure 3) 
of computer to computer communi- 
cation. The problem with virus and 
worm attacks is that they do not fol- 
low the association model. The end- 
points of the communication are no 
longer secure. Thus virus and worm 
attacks can pose a real threat. 
Professional responsibility 
As scientific and engineering pro- 
fessionals, we have a collective re- 
sponsibility to police ourselves, much 
as the medical community does. In 
the past, violations of computing sys- 
tems were seen as a “test of exper- 
tise,” and successful violators were 
regarded with some awe by their 
colleagues. This view must change. 
After the DARPA Internet attack, 
the governing boards of two ma- 
jor computer networks, BITNET and 
CSNET, issued a joint statement on 
issues of computer security. Of pri- 
mary concern to them were state- 
ments made by many computing 
professionals in response to the in- 
cident: 
. . . (We) have been struck by the 
fact that many public comments on 
the event have contained statements 
such as, “We learned from it, ” “We 
Guarding flank by the book 
The association model assumes that the attack will be made on a well-defined 
communication path called an association between two services at their ports. 
Attacks may be passive or active. A passive attack involves obtaining information 
in an unauthorized way by “listening” to an association. Such information might 
be system passwords, payroll data, social security numbers, and so forth. In an 
active attack, an intruder might synthesize bogus messages and insert them into 
the association, play back messages from a previous association at some later 
time, or deny the receiving member all of its messages. 
The primary tool for protection from attack is cryptography in which messages 
are protected by secret codes known only to members of the association and 
which are difficult for an intruder to obtain or guess. Encryption of a message 
protects it from a passive attack. Protection from an active attack can be achieved 
by requiring each member of the association to identify itself to each other member 
of the association through a private encrypted digital signature. This ensures that 
an intruder cannot forge the identity of a valid member of an association. Denial of 
service may be guarded against by requiring both participants in the association 
to exchange some predetermined secret information at the start and end of the 
association. To prevent the playback of an old association, the current date and 
time may be encrypted as part of the initial exchange to ensure the association is 
current. 
Fig. 3. The association model. 
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will make sure technically that it 
will not happen again,” or “He did 
us a favor by showing . . ., ” unac- 
companied by expressions of ethical 
concern. . . 
They go on to make the following 
We condemn the perpetration of 
such “experiments, games, or fea- 
tures” by workers in our j?eM be 
they students, faculty, researchers or 
providers. We are especially wor- 
ried about widespread tendencies to 
justib, ignore, or perpetuate such 
breaches. We must behave as do 
our fellow scientists who have or- 
ganized around comparable issues 
to enforce strong ethical practices 
in the conduct of experiments. 
Clearly the point being made is 
that computer networks are vital 
economic systems whose disruption 
could cause a significant nationwide 
societal impact. The time when com- 
puter security violations were written 
off as “pranks” has passed. 
A debate exists as to whether, 
when a security problem is found, 
to keep the flaw a secret or publish 
it. The former group sees publication 
of existing security holes as a threat 
that simply invites “exploration.” In 
some respects, this is a valid view- 
point. If it were found that one could 
break into a bank vault by simply 
kicking it in at some obscure place, 
mentioning this fact to the general 
public would not be wise. On the 
other hand, such a situation certainly 
should be rectified. The latter group, 
in the interest of removing the prob- 
lem by engaging the resources of the 
computing community to find a so- 
lution, is perhaps the most widely 
held view. While, in view of the con- 
demnation by the BITNETKSNET 
boards, the first view might be ap- 
propriate, in reality, the second view 
is more plausible. We simply must 
assume that malicious intruders exist 
and take actions to protect ourselves. 
Protection 
comment: 
When you hook your computer to 
a network, you are hooking up to 
every computer that computer has 
been with. . . 
“Saturday Night Live, ” 1988 
How can we protect systems from 
unauthorized intrusion? The amount 
of protection provided is in inverse 
proportion to the ease of usability of 
the system. Figure 4 illustrates some 
options ranging from “safe” to “take 
your chances.” 
Achieving safe computing is diffi- 
cult if your computer is connected to 
an internetwork. The benefits of net- 
work interconnection, however, tend 
to far outweigh the disadvantages. 
This brings us back to the mice 
problem, which finally did get re- 
solved. Putting the snacks in glass 
jars and letting the mice run innocu- 
ously around our feet was the ulti- 
mate solution (we could hardly put 
our office in a glass jar). The moral? 
Protect what you really want to keep 
safe; the rest doesn’t really matter. 
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